The economic downturn that began in 2001 resulted in massive budget shortfalls and arguably the worst fiscal conditions for state governments in nearly 50 years. States' use of savings to stabilize cyclical fluctuations in the budget has been institutionalized via budget stabilization funds. In this paper we explore how state expenditure volatility is affected by the existence, size, and structure of stabilization funds. The results indicate that while most states have not reduced the volatility of expenditures over the business cycle, states with rule-bound stabilization funds have witnessed significantly less expenditure volatility from utilizing a budget stabilization fund.
Introduction
During much of the 1990s, stock market gains and robust economic growth provided a windfall of revenue that allowed state policymakers to enact sizable, permanent tax cuts. As economic activity began to slow in 2001, the recently adopted tax cuts forced states into their worst fiscal position in nearly 50 years. According to the National Governors Association (NGA), 40 states were forced to reduce budgeted expenditures by nearly $12 billion in fiscal year 2003, which was an increase from the 38 states that cut budgeted spending in 2002.
1 In planning for fiscal year 2004, the NGA reports that 13 states enacted negative growth budgets and aggregate (nominal) state spending is expected to grow at its slowest rate (0.2 percent) since 1979.
State policymakers rely heavily on expenditure reductions and tax increases to alleviate budget shortfalls because, unlike the federal government, most states' options are constrained by anti-deficit rules and borrowing restrictions (Poterba, 1994) . And while states have an established history of growing general fund surpluses during expansions to buffer future revenue shocks, over the past 20 years nearly all states have institutionalized the use of savings via budget stabilization funds (often referred to as "rainy day funds") to help smooth cyclical fluctuations in the budget and lessen the sting of tax and expenditure adjustments. During fiscal years 2002 and 2003 for instance, more than half of the 46 states with budget stabilization funds relied on $8 billion from these instruments to help close budget gaps, which is considerably more than the $1 billion in stabilization fund balances tapped during the 1990-91 downturn (Holcombe and Sobel, 1997) .
The fact that properly structured BSFs can be a valuable tool to increase a state's savings is well established in the literature. However, the extent to which BSFs permit state policymakers to smooth expenditures or taxes over the business cycle, or simply retire debt, has yet to be explored. Given states' experiences during the most recent downturn and the fact that expenditure reductions and tax increases could contribute to the duration of a recession, understanding the stabilizing role of BSFs is valuable. Using data that spans the entire history of budget stabilization fund usage for nearly all states, this paper is the first to explore the role the existence, size, and structure BSFs play in smoothing state-level expenditures over the business cycle. We examine the role of BSFs in smoothing expenditures, as opposed to smoothing tax rates or retiring debt, because Poterba (1994) finds that states are far more likely to increase taxes in response to unexpected deficits than reduce expenditures, which suggests that policymakers may be more interested in stabilizing expenditures than tax rates over the business cycle.
The empirical results indicate that while the "average" state has not experienced a more stable expenditure stream from utilizing a budget stabilization fund, we do find the degree of expenditure smoothing to be directly related to the stringency of the deposit and withdrawal rules governing the fund's operation. In other words, the empirical results show that states who adopt and/or utilize more rule-bound stabilization funds experience significantly less expenditure volatility than do states without (or with improperly structured) BSFs.
In the following sections of the paper we review previous research, present a theoretical model of expenditure cyclicality, outline the empirical methodology and findings, and offer concluding remarks.
Previous Research and Theoretical Framework

Background and previous research on budget stabilization funds
The expanded use of budget stabilization funds (hereafter "BSFs") over the past two decades (noted below in Table 1 ) signals the growing importance policymakers place on savings to offset revenue shortfalls. While more than 90 percent of states currently utilize a BSF, the most rapid increase in usage occurred during the 1980s when 24 states adopted funds.
From the perspective of policymakers, budget stabilization funds may be a more appealing tool for mitigating downturns than expenditure reductions and tax increase for several reasons. First, expenditure reductions and tax increases, which may be necessary due to balanced budget rules that prohibit deficits, are contractionary policies that may contribute to the duration of a downturn. Second, the use of expenditure reductions and tax increases are politically costly.
For instance, Sobel (1998) finds that states with more discretionary increases in taxes and reductions in expenditures during the 1990-91 recession have significantly higher turnover rates in the legislature.
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The expanded use of BSFs is the primary reason why states relied on considerably more BSF monies during the most recent downturn than during the 1990-91 recession. Rather than maintaining a BSF balance equal to the allowable cap (see Table 1 ) or 5 percent of the budget as bond ratings agencies suggest, most states have historically maintained a BSF balance between 1.5 and 3 percent of the budget.
Prior to the creation of budget stabilization funds, state governments regularly maintained a general fund surplus during period of revenue growth for use during recessions. With the addition of a BSF, states tend to maintain reserve balances in both the general fund and BSF because the only practical difference between the two accounts is that while policymakers deposit and withdraw surplus monies from the general fund at their discretion, deposits and withdraws from BSFs tend to be governed by specific rules. As demonstrated in Table 1 for example, 9 states deposit monies by legislative appropriation, 25 deposit funds only in the event of a budget surplus, 6 states are required to deposit monies if revenue growth is positive, and 6 deposit funds in accordance with a pre-established formula.
While the difference between a BSF and general fund surplus may appear to be trivial, previous research suggests that the fiscal benefits of utilizing a BSF depend highly on the structure of the fund's deposit and withdrawal rules. Sobel and Holcombe (1996) , Knight and Levinson (1999), and Wagner (2003) find that states with more rule-bound (or "strict") BSFs, meaning those funds that force deposits and limit withdraws, save significantly more than states without BSFs or whose BSFs do not have such rules. Moreover, Wagner (2004) finds that states with strict BSFs face significantly lower borrowing costs than states without BSFs. With regard to the deposit and withdrawal rules in Table 1 , category (3) and (4) rules are "strict" because they require deposits and limit withdraws as long as the pre-established criteria are satisfied, while category (1) and (2) rules are "weak" because they are based on legislative discretion.
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The fact that strict-rule BSFs have proven to be more effective than BSFs governed largely by legislative discretion is not surprising because as Wagner (2003) notes, the extent to which general fund surpluses and BSF balances are substitutable should depend on the "closeness" of the BSF rules to legislative discretion: the more policymaker discretion over the use of BSF monies, the more likely such monies will simply replace monies that were previously maintained as a general fund surplus. In other words, the existence of strict-rule BSFs prevent time inconsistency problems from arising while BSFs governed (effectively) by legislative discretion do not. Thus, while policymakers may have a strong incentive to save during periods of robust revenue growth (possibility to ensure their own long-term political survival), the realization of a budget surplus also carries with it pressure from constituents and interest groups to increase expenditures or reduce taxes. In the short-term, policymakers may find it in their best interest to act on these pressures, thereby making previous plans to save time inconsistent. BSFs governed by strict deposit and withdrawal rules provide policymakers with a mechanism that may force their behavior to be time consistent and increases the likelihood that a state will be better prepared for future downturns.
Theoretical model
In this section of the paper we develop a simple theoretical framework that may be used to compare the volatility of government expenditures in a state without a BSF to the volatility in a state with a "strict" BSF. A "strict" BSF is assumed to be a stabilization fund that is governed by rules that force policymakers to deposit monies and limits when the monies may be accessed. We develop a theoretical model for two reasons. First, the model allows us to better demonstrate why a strict BSF smoothes spending. That is, is the decrease in spending volatility that we find empirically associated with states with a BSF due to lower spending during high-revenue periods or is the decreased spending volatility due to higher spending during low-revenue periods. An alternative way of thinking about this issue is whether the strict deposit rules or strict withdrawal rules that contribute more significantly to the decreased spending volatility. Strict deposit rules limit a government's ability to spend during high-revenue periods and force the government to accumulate more savings which can be used to buffer spending cuts during future low-revenue periods. Although it may seem obvious that strict deposit rules would result in smoother spending patterns, it is not quite as obvious for the strict withdrawal rules. This ambiguity is because on the one hand, strict withdrawal rules generally mean that, going forward, the surpluses available to tap into in the case of a low-revenue period are larger which would tend to contribute to smoother savings. On the other hand, strict withdrawal rules also limit a government's ability to smooth spending in the event of an actual low-revenue period. An additional reason to develop a model is that a model allows us to develop testable implications concerning the effects of prior budget surpluses and volatility of revenue on the volatility of expenditures. In the context of the model, we first examine the optimal expenditure decisions of an unconstrained government (one without a BSF), and then using a similar setup, impose constraints concerning BSF deposits and withdraws.
The model assumes a forward-looking government who lives for two periods, t = 1, 2, and faces uncertainty concerning current and future revenue. In each period revenue may be either high or low, denoted as R t ∈ {R t,H , R t,L } with R t,H > R t,L .
3 The revenue process is assumed to be described by a two-state Markov chain with conditional transition probabilities π ij , denoting
We assume the government chooses a sequence for spending, G t , (assuming tax rates are constant) to maximize expected utility given by a time separable utility function:
where E 0 is the expectation operator conditional on time 0 information. The government's optimal spending in each period is contingent upon the realization of revenue in that period, and second-period spending is conditional upon the realization of first-period revenue. To denote the dependence on current period revenue, government spending is subscripted by the time period and the realization of revenue,
We further assume the government maximizes expected utility subject to the constraint that spending is non-negative. The government may enter period 1 with some accumulated savings (debt), (1+r)S 0 , incurred from predecessors. If there is debt, the government does not have to pay off the debt, but they must pay the interest on that debt. Because nearly all states have a balanced-budget provision, we prohibit the government from spending that would require issuing debt. Finally, the period-by-period budget constraint describes the evolution of government savings is given by:
where the change in savings, ∆S t is the difference between revenue and interest received on previous savings and total government spending (sum of government spending on goods and services and transfer payments).
For each realization of first-period revenue, optimal first-period spending satisfies the familiar Euler equation:
for j=H,L. Assuming CRRA utility of the form
, the first-order conditions for G 1,j are:
subject to the no debt restriction, G 1,j ≤ (1+r)S 0 + R 1,j , j = H,L. The Euler equation equates the marginal utility of spending an additional dollar in the first-period with the discounted expected marginal utility of saving an additional dollar in the first-period. The uncertainty of secondperiod revenue creates a potential precautionary motive to save, and in this sense, the model above is a simplified model of the class of precautionary savings models developed by Zeldes (1989) , Deaton (1991), Kimball and Mankiw (1989 ), and Carroll (1992 , 1997 .
To incorporate BSFs into the model, the savings motive from a strict BSF can be modeled by adding two additional constraints that describe deposits and withdraws from a savings fund. In other words, if revenue is high, then a government with a BSF that has a strict deposit rule must deposit an amount, δ H , of the revenue into the BSF. Alternatively, if revenue is low, then a government with a BSF that has a strict withdraw rule may withdraw an amount,
, from the BSF if the balance is positive. The simplest approach to formally modeling these constraints is to express the constraints as limits on government expenditures. Hence, if first-period revenue is high (and the government must deposit δ H into their BSF), then
The optimal first-period spending, for each realization of revenue, for a government with a strict BSF satisfies the Euler equation:
, and the no debt restriction. The difference between equations (3) and (4) is that the last term in (3) no longer appears in (4). When secondperiod revenue is high the government is required to save δ H in the second period and spends the remaining portion. Furthermore, if revenue is high in the second-period, then the government is not able to access saved funds so the marginal utility of an additional saved dollar (in the firstperiod) is zero and that term drops out of the first-order condition since
The solution to equation (4) gives the optimal desired first-period spending levels for a government with a strict BSF. If the desired spending level is greater then the constrained spending level that may occur when the government is forced to deposit or withdraw funds from the BSF, then the actual spending level will equal the constrained level. In terms of the model, if Second-period spending is determined after solving equations (3) and (4) 
The expected level of spending in each period, µ t,G , is given by:
where G 2,k |R 1 = R j , j,k=H,L is second-period government spending when second-period revenue is R k given first-period revenue was R j . To maintain consistency with the empirical work in Section 3, we use the expected deviation from mean spending in the second period as the measure of spending volatility. We concentrate on the second-period expected deviations to focus attention on the "longer" term impact of BSF's on spending volatility as opposed to the immediate effects which are more closely proxied by the first-period expected deviations. The second-period expected deviations from mean spending, E(D 2 ), is:
We simulate the model and assume the following parameter values for the base case: π HH = .9 and π LL = .7, ρ=1 (log utility), r = .04, β = (1+r)
The simulated results are presented below in Table 2 .
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As columns 1 and 2 show, the expected volatility of expenditures, which is given in the row labeled "Expected MAD" in Table 2 , is lower for governments that require deposits and limit withdraws (those with strict BSFs) than for governments that save at the discretion of policymakers (those without BSFs). This is due to both the fact that governments with strict BSFs have higher expected savings and are therefore better able to buffer expenditures against future adverse revenue shocks as well as the fact that the strict rules limit spending in the second period. It is also worth noting that governments with strict BSFs spend about 3.8 percent less than governments without BSFs (because of the forced deposits into the BSF), which may have interesting dynamic effects on future tax rates, public sector growth, and income growth rates.
To explore the individual role of strict BSF deposit and withdrawal rules on expenditure volatility, we separately examine the following cases: (1) a BSF is governed by a strict deposit rule (δ H =3) and no withdrawal rule, and (2) a BSF is governed by no deposit rule and a strict withdrawal rule (δ L =2). The results of these simulations are given in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 respectively. As the results show, the volatility of expenditures diminishes slightly when only a strict withdrawal rule is in place versus no BSF (neither strict withdrawal nor strict deposit rules). This result is primarily due to the greater extent of depletion of savings for a "no BSF state" (compared to a strict withdrawal BSF state) during a low-revenue first period which ultimately results in lower spending in the second period regardless of the state of revenue. In contrast however, a BSF governed by a strict deposit rule does result in significantly lower expenditure volatility, but the reduction is not as large as when both strict deposit and strict withdrawal rules are in place. The strict deposit rule significantly lowers spending volatility (relative to a "no BSF state) because 1) the forced accumulation of savings during a highrevenue first-period allows an increase in spending if the second period is a low-revenue period, and 2) the strict deposit rule limits spending in a high-revenue second period. This finding suggests that strict deposit rules have a much larger marginal effect on spending volatility than strict withdraw rules. Table 2 also compares the volatility of expenditures between regimes with and without strict BSFs when initial savings (S 0 ) is zero. These results are located in columns 5 and 6 and illustrate that while both governments have higher volatility when initial savings is zero (resulting from a reduced ability to buffer low realizations of revenue), governments with strict BSFs continue to have higher expected savings and lower expected volatility.
The final two columns of Table 2 , columns 7 and 8, illustrate how expenditure volatility responds as revenue uncertainty rises (which is simulated by increasing R H to 103 and reducing R L to 91 while keeping the expected value the same). In this scenario, expenditure volatility increases for regimes without BSFs because there is a greater precautionary savings motive.
Expenditure volatility also rises for governments with BSFs (although it remains lower than governments without such a fund) because the greater revenue volatility, which is manifested in a larger gap between high and low revenue, increases the gap between what the government is capable of spending when revenue is high and low, resulting in increased expenditure volatility.
Empirical Methodology
Measuring the cyclical variability in government expenditures
Recent studies of fiscal cyclicality, such as Lane (2003) , measure cyclical variability using the standard deviation in a cross-sectional framework. Specifically, Lane (2003) computes the standard deviation of output growth for a given region over time and this measure is then regressed on a set of fiscal policy and other control variables.
Since all but 4 states have adopted budget stabilization funds at various times over the past 30 years, a cross-sectional framework along the lines of Lane (2003) is not feasible because there is no suitable sample period from which we may compare states with BSFs to a sufficient number of states without BSFs. As a result, we measure the cyclical variability of expenditures using the absolute value of the cyclical component obtained by detrending real per capita expenditures over the period from 1945 to 1999. To explore the robustness of the variability measure and estimates, we decompose the trend and cyclical components of each state's real per capita general fund expenditures using both the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) and band-pass filter developed by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) . Appendix B of the paper discusses both the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) and band-pass (BP) filters in more detail. 6 The mean cyclical variability in state expenditures (in absolute value), extracted individually from each state using both the HP and BP filters, is illustrated below in Figure 1 .
Overall, while the mean cyclical variability figures using the HP filter tend to be slightly larger than the BP figures in most years, the turning points over the sample period are quite similar. In addition, the HP and BP filters produce very comparable mean values, $31.15 and $30.44 respectively, when computed across all states and years.
[ Figure 1 about here]
With regard to individual states, there are notable similarities and differences between the HP and BP figures. For example, using the HP filter, Ohio has the smallest mean deviation from trend ($17.72) and Virginia's cyclical variability has the smallest standard deviation ($11.43).
Interestingly, the positions of Ohio and Virginia switch when the cyclical variability is measured by the BP filter -Virginia is found to have the smallest mean deviation from trend ($14.76), while Ohio's cyclical variability has the smallest standard deviation ($11.50 
where X it is a vector of economic, political, and demographic factors in state i at time t assumed to influence the cyclical variability of government expenditures, BSF it is a vector of budget stabilization fund characteristics in state i at time t, i γ and t θ denote the fixed state-and timeeffects respectively, α is the constant term, it ε is the error term, i is the index of the N states, and t denotes the index of the T time periods. The inclusion of fixed time-effects will control for aggregate shocks that may force state expenditures to deviate from trend, while the fixed state-7 Although the cyclical component of state expenditures was extracted, for both the HP and BP filters, using data over the period from 1945 to 1999, the empirical models in the paper use the cyclical components over the period from 1969 to 1999 due to data limitations with other variables. The mean and standard deviation figures reported in Section 3.1 of the paper use the cyclical variability figures over the period from 1969 to 1999.
8 Hawaii and Alaska are excluded from the sample due to the fact that their economies differ greatly from other states. Nebraska and Minnesota were also excluded due to the fact they have, or have had, periods in which state legislators were elected without party designation, which made it impossible for us to determine the state's controlling political party. The starting period of our sample (1969) effects will control for any time-invariant, state-specific factors that may affect expenditure cyclicality.
Given Carlino and Sill's (2001) finding that there are regional trends and cycles in income fluctuations at the state level, it is reasonable to assume that regional trends and cycles may also be present in state-level expenditures, which suggests that the error term may be correlated across states. As a result, we estimate equation (7) by Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) and model the estimated covariance matrix as I ⊗ Σ = Ωˆ, where Σ is the crosssectional (NxN) matrix of estimated contemporaneous correlations and I is a TxT identity matrix.
Consistent with the theoretical model, we include the cyclical variability in a state's revenue, cyclical variability of federal aid, cyclical variability of real per capita personal income, and previous budget surplus/deficit as regressors. We expect increases in the cyclical volatility of revenue, federal aid, and personal income to be positively correlated with expenditure cyclicality, while increases in the previous budget surplus/deficit should be negatively correlated with expenditure volatility. The revenue and federal aid variables will control for fluctuations in revenue streams, the previous budget surplus/deficit will control for smoothing effects from a state's other source (in addition to BSF monies) of savings, and the personal income variable will control for state-specific economic shocks that may push expenditures away from trend.
To maintain consistency with the methodology for measuring expenditure cyclicality, we measure revenue, personal income, and federal aid cyclicality as the absolute value of the The model also includes several demographic variables that may affect a state's expenditure volatility. First, we include the state's real per capita income to control for potential income effects. Next, we include both the percentage of a state's residents age 65 and older and the percentage of state employees employed by state and local governments as control variables.
Since the percentage of residents age 65 and older and government employees represent powerful constituencies, we expect increases in these groups to result in greater volatility due to the "voracity effect" described by Tornell and Lane (1999) . Tornell and Lane argue that fiscal competition may expand during upturns such that government spending may grow faster than income grows, resulting in more volatile spending. Lane (2003) finds empirical support for this "voracity effect" with government employees across OCED countries.
In addition to demographic factors, the empirical specification controls for fiscal institutions that have been shown to have real economic effects.
9 Specifically, the model includes indicator variables for whether the state has a strict balanced budget rule that precludes fiscalyear-end deficits and the existence of both expenditure and tax limitation laws. Since states with strict balanced budget rules are forced to either reduce expenditures and/or increase taxes in the event of a budget shortfall, we expect a stringent balanced budget rule to be positively correlated with expenditure cyclicality, ceteris paribus. With regard to expenditure limitation laws, it is plausible that such rules could either increase or decrease expenditure volatility, depending on the volatility of real income growth. Given that expenditure limitation laws are generally based on the growth in real personal income, a state with more volatile growth in real income may 9 For an overview of the effects of state fiscal institutions see Bohn and Inman (1996) and Poterba (1996) . experience more volatile expenditures since the "expenditure cap" will change with income growth. On the other hand, we expect a binding tax limitation law to be associated with a reduction in expenditure volatility, other factors constant, since it will limit the growth in revenue during upturns and therefore should result in a more stable expenditure stream.
A number of recent studies, such as Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995), suggest that a state's political climate influences fiscal behavior. To account for the state's political climate we estimate equation (7) with an indicator variable that equals unity if the state's legislature and Governorship are controlled by different parties.
The dynamic government and citizen ideology indices developed by Berry et al. (1998) are also included as regressors. These ideology scores take on a value of 0 to 100, with 100 being the most liberal value and 0 being the most conservative value. In combination with the statespecific and time-specific fixed effects, the ideology measures should help control for unobservable government and citizen tastes that could serve as a source of potential endogeneity between expenditure cyclicality and the regressors.
Finally, the paper assesses the impact of BSFs on expenditure cyclicality by estimating four separate regressions based on equation (7). First, Model (I) includes an indicator variable that equals unity beginning with the year a state adopted a BSF and equals zero otherwise. This specification will reveal, on average, how state expenditure cyclicality has changed as a result of utilizing a BSF.
Next, Model (II) interacts the BSF adoption indicator with indicator variables reflecting the various combinations of deposit and withdrawal rules. This will reveal how the volatility of expenditures has changed following BSF adoption in states with different types of BSFs.
Specifically, Model (II) interacts the state's BSF adoption indicator with indicator variables for:
(1) strict deposit and strict withdrawal rules, (2) weak deposit and weak withdrawal rules, (3) strict deposit and weak withdrawal rules, and (4) weak deposit and strict withdrawal rules. A "strict" deposit/withdrawal rule is either a category (3) or (4) rule in 
Estimation Results
The results of the four adaptations of equation (7) are provided below in Table 3 . Models (I), (II), (III), and (IV) were each estimated by extracting the cyclical components using both the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) and band-pass (BP) filters, resulting in a total of eight regressions.
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With the respect to the control variables, the estimates are generally robust across Models (I) -(IV) and to the measurement of cyclicality. We find, for instance, that a $1 per capita increase in the state's cyclical variability of revenue and federal aid results in a significant increase in expenditure cyclicality of $0.14 -$0.16 and $0.25 -$0.31 respectively. Consistent with the theory, more cyclical variability in a state's revenue sources results in greater expenditure volatility, other factors constant.
In addition, the paper also finds that states that carry larger general fund surpluses have significantly more stable expenditures, ceteris paribus. In fact, a $1 per capita increase in the state's general fund surplus is found to reduce expenditure volatility by roughly $0.03, which is significant at the 1 percent level and robust to the measurement of cyclicality. Although the estimate is rather small, this result is consistent with Sorenson and Yosha's (2001) finding that state surpluses are procyclical and promote stabilization. This result is consistent with the theoretical results comparing Table 2 Expenditure limitation laws significantly increase the volatility of expenditures in the range of $7.30 -$9.70 per capita, ceteris paribus. Since expenditure limit laws are typically based on population growth and/or growth in real personal income, policymakers may both "spend up to the cap" during expansionary periods and be forced to "cut spending to the cap" during slowdowns, which could result in greater volatility. Given that the cyclical variability of expenditures averages $31 per capita in our sample, our estimates for expenditure limitation laws suggest that they increase the volatility of spending by 23 to 31 percent, other factors constant.
In contrast to expenditure limits, we find weak evidence that strict balanced budget rules affect expenditure volatility and no evidence that tax limitation laws affect the volatility of expenditures. A strict balanced budget rule significantly increases (at the 10 percent level)
expenditure volatility in the range of $10 -$11 per capita in the BP filter models, but we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that balanced budget rules equal zero in the HP regressions.
Turning our attention to budget stabilization funds, the results from Models ( these empirical results indicate that while a strict deposit rule can result in lower expenditure volatility (since it has greater marginal effect than a strict withdrawal rule), the presence of both a strict deposit and strict withdrawal rule generates the greatest reduction in expenditure volatility.
Overall, the estimates from Models (I) -(IV) generate some very clear conclusions and implications. First, although a strict deposit rule reduces the cyclical variability of expenditures compared to states without (or with ineffective) BSFs, a combination of rules that force deposits and limit withdrawals generates the greatest expenditure smoothing and can provide policymakers with a time-consistent stabilization vehicle. Thus, regardless of whether policymakers view the objective of a BSF as a tool to mitigate revenue shocks during one fiscal year or over a multi-year recession, our results suggest that the objectives may not be achieved unless strict rules are in place.
Finally, while this paper addresses the limited question of expenditure smoothing, state policymakers and/or voters may prefer to utilize stabilization fund balances to stabilize revenue over the business cycle, which could be accomplished by reducing the number or size of tax increases, or retire debt. Both of these options could, in theory, limit a state's ability to stabilize expenditures over the business cycle and these issues remain unexplored in the literature. And given that we find that a $1 increase in the BSF balance smoothes expenditures by less than $1, our results suggest that exploring these options may be fruitful.
Conclusion
The fact that most U.S. states have institutionalized countercyclical fiscal policy through budget stabilization funds (or "rainy day funds") provides a unique opportunity to explore the role of fiscal policy as a means to promote stabilization. Using data that spans the entire history of stabilization fund usage for nearly all states, this paper is the first to investigate how the existence, size, and structure of budget stabilization funds impact the cyclical variability of state government expenditures.
Controlling for the effects of demographic, political, and economic factors, we find that a state's ability to smooth expenditures over the business cycle using a budget stabilization fund is highly dependent on the structure of the deposit and withdrawal rules governing the fund.
Specifically, the results show that states whose policymakers have discretion over both deposits and withdrawals experience no significant reduction in expenditure volatility compared to states without stabilization funds, suggesting that such funds are tantamount to having no fund at all, at least from the perspective of expenditure smoothing.
In contrast however, stabilization funds governed by one or more strict rules, meaning those that actually require deposits or limit withdrawals, result in significant reductions in the cyclical variability of expenditures. In fact, while we find that states with stabilization funds governed by only one strict rule may experience more stable expenditure streams, states with rule-bound budget stabilization funds witness reductions in the volatility of expenditures that are nearly three times as large as states with only one stringent rule. This suggests that if government policymakers are truly interested in smoothing expenditures over the business cycle, then adopting a rule-bound budget stabilization can provide policymakers with a time-consistent tool to achieve that goal.
Finally, the extent to which stabilization funds contribute to expenditure smoothing will be dependent on policymakers' preferences for spending, taxes, debt, and the rate at which they discount the future. These areas require additional research to determine what the objectives of policymakers and/or voters are, and the role budget stabilization funds can play in achieving those objectives.
Table 1 -Summary of State Budget Stabilization Funds (as of 2002)
Deposit Rules Withdrawal Rules Fund Size 1 = by legislative appropriation 1 = by legislative appropriation 1 = 5% of budget or less 2 = in the event of a budget surplus 2 = in the event of a budget deficit 2 = between 5 and 25% 3 = if revenue growth is positive 3 = if supermajority legislative approval 3 = no limit 4 = following a mathematical formula 4 = following a mathematical formula IA  1992  1  1  1  SC  1978  3  2  3  KS  1993  3  1  3  SD  1991  2  2  1  KY  1983  2  1  1  TN  1972  3  2  1  LA  1990  2  1  3  TX  1987  2  2  2  MA  1986  2  1  1  UT  1986  2  2  2  ME  1985  2  1  1  VT  1988  2  2  1  MD  1986  3  1  1  VA  1992  4  4  2  MI  1977  4  4  2  WA  1981  2  3  1  MN  1981  1  1  2  WV  1994  2  2  1  MS  1982  1  1  2  WI  1981  3  2  3  MO  1992  1  1  1  WY  1982  1 The base case parameters are π HH = .9 and π LL = .7, ρ=1 (log utility), r = .04, β = (1+r) -1 , R H = 102, mean revenue (µ R ) = 100, R L = (µ R -π H R H )/π L = 94, and δ H =3, δ L =2, S 0 =4. The results for a government without a BSF are reported in the first column, while the results for a government with a BSF are in the second column. The third column contains results are for a strict deposit rule (δ H =3) combined with no withdraw rule. The fourth column contains results for the no deposit rule combined with a strict withdraw rule case (δ l =2). Columns five and six report results when initial savings is zero (instead of 4 as in the base case) for the cases of no rules and strict deposit/strict withdraw rules. Columns seven and eight report results when revenue volatility increases (simulated by increasing R H to 103 and reducing R L to 91 while keeping the expected value the same). 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 HP Filter BP Filter Wagner (2003) Notes: The following states are excluded from the sample: Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, and Nebraska. All real variables were deflated using the CPI-U (1982 . State population figures were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Descriptive statistics for cyclical variability measures using the Band-Pass filter are not reported but are available from the authors. Expenditure and tax limitation laws are considered binding if they cannot be overridden by a simple majority vote of the legislature. Weak deposit and withdrawal rules are category (1) and (2) rules in Table 1 , while strict rules are category (3) and (4) rules in 
Appendix B -Hodrick-Prescott (HP) and band pass (BP) filters
The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) and band pass (BP) filters extract the business cycle component from a time series. The HP filter decomposes a time series (y t ) into a trend/smoothed component (S t ) and cyclical component (C t ). Specifically, the HP filter obtains the trend or smoothed component from solving the minimization problem: 
where λ denotes the smoothness parameter. Once the smoothed series has been obtained from the problem, the cyclical component (C t ) is obtained from C t = y t -S t .
The larger the smoothness parameter, the smoother the trend series. While a consensus exists regarding the value of λ for quarterly data ( 1600 = λ ), any consensus disappears in the presence of different frequencies. For annual data suggestions about the smoothness parameter range from a low of 10 to a high of 400 (Baxter and King, 1999) . Since macroeconomists generally agree, see Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) , that cyclical components are those frequencies between 6 quarters and 32 quarters, we set the smoothness parameter equal to 10 since Baxter and King (1999) show that such a value performs quite well in removing frequencies larger than 32 quarters.
In contrast to the HP filter, band pass filters rely on the Spectral Representation Theorem to decompose a time series without imposing any particular distributional assumptions on the underlying series. Christiano and Fitzgerald find that their filter works reasonably well (outperforms the HP filter) in all circumstances except when the data series is first differenced and exhibits negative autocorrelation.
Letting C denote the cyclical component of our series, y t , the Christiano-Fitzgerald BP filter is obtained by minimizing the mean square error criterion given by:
where E is the expectation operator and w t is the filter weight at time t. Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) show that the optimal linear filter weight to approximate the cyclical variation in y t between periods u l and ρ ρ may be expressed as: 
The time period selection parameters, u l and ρ ρ , are central in isolating the appropriate data frequency for analysis. Since the typical view of business cycles assumes that cyclical fluctuations between 1.5 and 8 years constitute the cyclical component, we set 8 and 2 u = ρ = ρ l since we have annual data.
